Se publico un informe parcial de la Comision Winograd (la comision que nombro el gobierno israeli para investigar la ultima guerra en el Libano).
Recomiendo leerlo, no por temas de politica internacional sino por dos razones principales:
1. Se puede criticar (y yo lo hago) a Israel por muchas cosas, pero en temas de democracia y separacion de poderes es un ejemplo para el mundo. Pensemos cuantos paises nombrarian una comision en serio solo unos meses despues de la guerra, cuando aun la mayoria de los involucrados siguen en sus cargos.
A modo de ejemplo, vean esta frase:
» We place the primary responsibility for these failures on the Prime Minister, the minister of defense and the (outgoing) Chief of Staff. All three made a decisive personal contribution to these decisions and the way in which they were made»
2. La otra razon para leerlo, es que en muchas cosas parece un analisis de errores tipicos de management, simplemente hagan el paralelo: Knesset (parlamento) = Board, Prime Minister = CEO, Minister of Defense y Chief of Staff = VPs, IDF (el ejercito) = equipo
«a. The decision to respond with an immediate, intensive military strike was not based on a detailed, comprehensive and authorized military plan, based on careful study of the complex characteristics of the Lebanon arena. A meticulous examination of these characteristics would have revealed the following: the ability to achieve military gains having significant political-international weight was limited; an Israeli military strike would inevitably lead to missiles fired at the Israeli civilian north; there was not another effective military response to such missile attacks than an extensive and prolonged ground operation to capture the areas from which the missiles were fired – which would have a high «cost» and which did not enjoy broad support. These difficulties were not explicitly raised with the political leaders before the decision to strike was taken. (comentario de Pablo: El CEO le escondio informacion al Board)
Consequently, in making the decision to go to war, the government did not consider the whole range of options, including that of continuing the policy of ‘containment’, or combining political and diplomatic moves with military strikes below the ‘escalation level’, or military preparations without immediate military action – so as to maintain for Israel the full range of responses to the abduction. This failure reflects weakness in strategic thinking, which derives the response to the event from a more comprehensive and encompassing picture. (Comentario de Pablo: poca vision estrategica del CEO)
The support in the cabinet for this move was gained in part through ambiguity in the presentation of goals and modes of operation, so that ministers with different or even contradictory attitudes could support it. The ministers voted for a vague decision, without understanding and knowing its nature and implications. They authorized the commencement of a military campaign without considering how to exit it. (Comentario de Pablo: falta de transparencia con el Board»)
d. Some of the declared goals of the war were not clear and could not be achieved, and in part were not achievable by the authorized modes of military action. (CEO declara objetivos no claros e inalcanzables)
e. The IDF did not exhibit creativity in proposing alternative action possibilities, did not alert the political decision-makers to the discrepancy between its own scenarios and the authorized modes of action, and did not demand – as was necessary under its own plans – early mobilization of the reserves so they could be equipped and trained in case a ground operation would be required. (Interesante, el equipo tiene parte de la culpa, por no alertar correctamente)
f. Even after these facts became known to the political leaders, they failed to adapt the military way of operation and its goals to the reality on the ground. On the contrary, declared goals were too ambitious, and it was publicly stated that fighting would continue until they were achieved. But the authorized military operations did not enable their achievement. (Falta de flexibilidad para adaptarse a un mondo real diferente del que imaginamos)
……..
b. The Prime Minister made up his mind hastily, despite the fact that no detailed military plan was submitted to him and without asking for one. Also, his decision was made without close study of the complex features of the Lebanon front or of the military, political and diplomatic options available to Israel.He made his decision without systematic consultation with others, especially outside the IDF, despite not having experience in external-political and military affairs. In addition, he did not adequately consider political and professional reservations presented to him before the fateful decisions of July 12th. (Duro comentario contra el CEO :))
……
a. The Minister of Defense did not have knowledge or experience in military, political or governmental matters. He also did not have good knowledge of the basic principles of using military force to achieve political goals. (basicamente: el COO es un inepto 😉 )
b. Despite these serious gaps, he made his decisions during this period without systemic consultations with experienced political and professional experts, including outside the security establishment. In addition, he did not give adequate weight to reservations expressed in the meetings he attended. (ademas de inepto, arrogante….. si habre visto COOs como este 😉 )
y ahora el VP Engineering:
Among other things, the COS did not alert the political echelon to the serious shortcomings in the preparedness and the fitness of the armed forces for an extensive ground operation, if that became necessary. In addition, he did not clarify that the military assessments and analyses of the arena was that there was a high probability that a military strike against Hezbollah would make such a move necessary. (Falta de transparencia del VP Engineering )
c. The COS’ responsibility is aggravated by the fact that he knew well that both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense lacked adequate knowledge and experience in these matters, and by the fact that he had led them to believe that the IDF was ready and prepared and had operational plans fitting the situation. (peor todavia, sabia que sus jefes no entendian y los engano)
Interesante no?
Aca esta el link al report parcial, pero creo que tenemos muchas lecciones para aprender sobre Governancia Corporativa de este informe.
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Pablo Brenner & Sergio Fogel Blog 